The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, as well as the conflicts in Georgia and Cyprus, pose questions such as to what extent states can and should guarantee long-term investment protection in the contemporary dynamics of the international legal order. This article does not analyse the broader problems concerning territorial and diplomacy issues; rather, it centres on problems regarding economic interests and property rights protection. This article provides an overview and analysis of the international venues for protection of investors and investments from third states' conduct outside their borders. This article analyses the conflict in Crimea, a peninsula located in southern Ukraine. This case study is used as a backdrop for the examination of investment treaties' application (and applicability), as well as available protection mechanisms in international law in a context of disputed borders.
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The international community's reaction to these events in the form of economic sanctions imposed against Russia 13 resulted in countersanctions and expropriation of foreign 14 The process of establishing an administration over the territory -the so-called legal 'russianization' of Crimea -began in March 2014 with the nationalisation of property in late April 2014 15 and nearly complete establishment of the Crimean Federal system of governance, a process which allegedly ended in late 2014. 16 This complex geopolitical situation falls in line with the peninsula's history. 17 At the same time, that geopolitical and inter-state-centred analysis overlooks arrangements concerning the general protection of individuals heavily affected in their rights. These rights have different sources: customary international law dealing with inter-state matters;
international human rights law conferring rights directly to individuals; and international foreign investment law dealing with individual and corporate foreign investors.
International law without adjudication has been the norm in international affairs.
18
Many international legal frameworks have existed without a judicial enforcement mechanism attached to them. 19 Moreover, states have historically gone out of their way to justify all sorts of illegal behaviour from the viewpoint of international law. 20 The lack of effectiveness of traditional enforcement mechanisms gave rise to so-called judicialisation of international law.
In turn, the proliferation of international courts and tribunals has caused fragmentation 21 but, at the same time, increased the availability of different adjudicative settlement options. Focusing on the economic harm suffered as a result of the political clashes at the root of the conflict, this article analyses the judicial venues for protection of foreign investors in
Crimea. It argues that, although foreign investors have multiple international judicial fora where their rights may be asserted, these venues are seriously limited. The overall conclusion is that these venues are a toolbox of valuable but limited options for investors in the midst of a challenging situation. The argument will be developed in three sections.
The first pillar of the argument deals with the direct protection of foreign investments and of foreign investors in Crimea through the investor-state arbitration framework. It portrays the essential idea that property and individuals are the objects of protection under the investment treaty regime. Following the establishment of the object of protection, it explores a variety of jurisdictional issues. 
B. THE INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN CRIMEA
Conceptions of foreign investors and foreign investment
The object of protection under the investment regime concerns both individuals and property.
Historically, investors are regarded as individuals in the first place, whereas the protection of corporate bodies as investors has been almost completely ignored until recently.
24
In general, the facilitation of foreign investment as the fundamental purpose of the regime presumes investors, both corporate and natural persons, to be 'foreign'. This creates a requirement of investors' nationality 25 Diplomatic protection, in turn, is exercised by states on behalf of investors, be they natural or legal persons. Keeping this differentiation in mind, the article now turns to the analysis of the investment treaties' mechanism as a direct system of protection. This approach is conventional for bilateral as well as multilateral treaty instruments. 54 Hence, to establish whether a treaty applies in the first place, it is necessary to tackle issues connected to the meaning of 'territory' and 'nationality', as well as to address concerns regarding temporality matters.
The pragmatic approach to the applicability of investment treaties in the territory of Crimea
b) Territoriality of investment treaties
The term 'territory' in 'territory of the other Contracting Party' 55 may be interpreted as the 'entire territory' 56 within the actual and effective exercise of jurisdiction, 57 or narrowed to the strict literal meaning 58 of 'territory under the sovereignty' in some treaty instruments. 59 ECT, arts 1(10)(a), 26(1).
The Russia-Ukraine BIT's articulation of this element regards 'the territory of the Russian Federation or the territory of Ukraine and also their respective exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf as defined in conformity with the international law'. Thus, the main concern arising therefrom is whether the Russia-Ukraine BIT extends its application to the territories acquired by either of the contracting parties.
64
There are relevant policy considerations involved in this exercise of treaty construction, concretely regarding its extended application to all investments in a state's entire territory, 65 including territory which is subsequently annexed through legal or illegal means. Particularly, there is a plausible, pragmatic -insofar as it would enable the protection of individual investors -argument favouring the idea of characterising Crimea as Russian territory, at least since the formal annexation took place.
Putting forward the customary international law argument, the principles of succession support the extended application only if consistent with the ordinary meaning, object and purpose of the treaty 66 and insofar as it does not fundamentally change the conditions of operation.
67
The purpose of the investment treaty regime is to protect investors and to promote 60 Russian-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 1. 61 A tribunal may also look for an alternative argumentation and analyse all references to the meaning of the relevant treaty instrument. For instance, article 1(1) of the Russia-Ukraine BIT reads as follows: 'investments shall denote all kinds of property and intellectual values, which are put in by the investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party in conformity with the latter's legislation'. 75 In addition, article 2 contains a reference to the mutual obligation of each contracting party to guarantee, in conformity with its legislation, the complete and unconditional legal protection of investments and investors of the other contracting party. 76 In the context of these provisions as well as customary international law, 77 it is possible to conclude that the territory, pursuant to the applicable treaty wording, shall denote any piece of land where either of contracting parties exercises its legal and regulatory control, including any subsequently acquired or incorporated territory.
It is doubtful whether determining the applicability of the Russia-Ukraine BIT requires a decision on the legality of the territorial acquisition within a meaning of article 1(4). This is because the Russian and the Ukrainian original BIT texts may be read differently when compared with the English translation. Whilst the English version of article 1(4) refers to the term 'territory' defined in conformity with international law, the comma placed in the original Russian and the Ukrainian texts 78 allows for a different interpretation. Both original texts may be read in a way to provide that only the parties' respective exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be defined in conformity with international law whereas territory means 'the territory of the Russian Federation or the territory of the Ukraine'.
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Had the tribunal decided to bring articles 15, 29, 31 and 32 of the VCLT into play, Russian investment treaties would be automatically applicable in the territory of Crimea, unless any of the established exceptions are deemed relevant. This interpretation arguably accords the inclusive wording of the applicable investment treaty as well as its parties' intentions to grant the widest possible protection in order to strengthen mutual economic ties.
Furthermore, this approach allows for the avoidance of the need to elaborate on the international illegality argument and to answer the main question put before the tribunal, which is whether this treaty is applicable to the new territorial units acquired by either contracting state.
75 Russia-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 1(1). 76 ibid art 2(2). 77 VCLT, art 29. 78 Russia-Ukraine BIT (n 52) art 14. 79 ibid art 1(4).
Finally, in accordance with the principle pacta sunt servanda, the Russian Federation that incorporated the Crimean Peninsula into its federal structure shall be liable for nonfulfilment of any legal obligation arising out of that incorporation, including its investment treaties.
Limitations to the approach of the treaty extension to annexed territories a) Time limitations
Another question put before the tribunal regards the implications of the scenario in which a state exercising legal control over the territory at the time when investments are made is different to a state controlling part of its territory at the moment of expropriation. There are some important discrepancies in the wording of articles 1(1) and 12 of this agreement. In contrast to the terms 'carried out' used in article 12 83 vis-à-vis past continuous actions, the term 'put in' used in relation to investments in article 1(1) places a complete performance requirement in past time. 84 Conversely, the Russian and Ukrainian original texts of article 1(1) use the present continuous tense of 'carrying out' in regards to investments.
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Taking into account the general retrospective effect of this treaty, its wording may be interpreted in support of the position favouring continuation of investment, in contrast with the requirement of investing in the territory of another contracting state ab initio. Based on this analysis there may be no need to define the exact moment in time when the protected investments were made and for what period as long as these occurred after January 1, 1992.
b) Investors and investments
Nationality of an investor is a precondition for the existence of protected investment 
c) International illegality
The Sanum v Laos tribunal decided to extend the application of the PRC treaties to the Macao administrative region based on the purpose and wording of the PRC-Laos BIT. Firstly, the tribunal was dealing with the application of the treaties which third parties concluded after the acquisition of Macao. Secondly, the handover of Macao represents the resumption by the PRC to exercise its sovereignty over Macao. 102 In the Crimea scenario, Ukraine and other possibly affected states explicitly objected to the legality of the acquisition when it occurred, continuing to sanction it up to present. 
C. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF INVESTORS IN CRIMEA
The relationship between the parties in a foreign investment dispute settlement bears a strong resemblance to the relationship arising out of human rights claims as both regimes originate in the law of state responsibility dealing with legal relationships between individuals and states. 111 The human rights regime provides a model for protection of individual and corporate investors' rights, as well as a more settled solution to the question of the attribution of extraterritorial unlawful conduct.
The human rights protection framework a) Subject and object of human rights protection
As previously suggested, the object of the investment regime to some extent accords with the purpose of the human rights framework: to protect individual rights and property. 115 The ECtHR has jurisdiction to decide on complaints concerning violations of the ECHR allegedly committed by a state party to the Convention that directly and significantly affected the applicant. 116 The protection of investors under this legal framework mainly concerns the right to property, as guaranteed by Protocol No 1 to the ECHR (Protocol I). It is concerned with peaceful enjoyment of possession, protection from deprivation, and the right to control the use of property. 117 Although there is no explicit notion of the term 'expropriation' in the Convention, the ECtHR has provided guidance in its case law on whether measures taken by a state amount to expropriation 118 as opposed to merely taking of control or discriminatory treatment. 119 Procedurally speaking, states, individuals or groups of individuals may file applications before the ECtHR. 120 Further analysis on these matters is offered below.
b) General requirements of the inter-state and individual applications mechanisms
The erga omnes nature of the interests protected by human rights treaties ensures a member state's right to act without any direct interest but rather to enforce the European public order. 121 Hence, a state does not need to demonstrate any particular direct or indirect legal interest or to submit an application on behalf of an individual in order to trigger proceedings vis-order another state. Inter-state application requirements include the statement of facts and alleged conventional breaches, as well as the applicant's fulfilment of admissibility requirements.
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Conversely, an individual applicant must claim to be a victim directly affected by the impugned measure. 123 Similarly, an individual application must contain a statement of relevant facts, alleged violations and compliance with admissibility criteria. 124 Having established the competence to deal with the matter laid before it on a preliminary basis, 125 the ECtHR should consider the fulfilment of jurisdiction and admissibility criteria. This article deals only with issues which are problematic in the factual context of the Crimea case study.
Jurisdiction of the ECtHR a) Principle of extraterritoriality in human rights
A state's jurisdictional competence under the human rights regime is primarily territorial.
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In contrast to the currently unsettled practice of investment arbitration tribunals, the human rights regime has already developed extraterritorial solutions for cases involving an 
b) Instrumental character of human rights law in the context of the protection of investors
Referring to the discussion at the beginning of this article, irrespective of the legality of territorial acquisition, investors whose property was expropriated in that territory must be protected. 131 Hence, the direct investor-state system grants protection to individual investors in respect of their investment rights defined under the relevant framework. The principle of nonlegitimisation of illegally acquired territory precludes treaty succession. However, the flexibility of the system allows for consideration of the international rules on extraterritoriality in the context of investors' protection. Both major models of extraterritorial jurisdiction raise serious concerns vis-à-vis their capacity to achieve the policy that underpins this approach: providing protection to investors in the broadest sense possible. Concretely, this is because of the inherent uncertainty regarding the temporal moment in which the treaty providing the legal basis for protection starts to be applicable extraterritorially in the first place. Although, provided that evidence allows a more flexible position to be established and the third party intervention is providing arguments in support of such position, investor-state arbitration may provide redress even in such complex and contradictory political scenarios.
Helpful to some and unhelpful to others, this approach, however, does not add certainty in this system of international dispute resolution.
The personal model of jurisdiction in the human rights context may hardly be applicable in the Crimea scenario because of the lack of evidence implicating Russian military troops partaking in the annexation. 146 Moreover, establishing control of the Russian Federation over those actions would not be enough to attribute the actual property deprivation or other discriminatory actions against investors to Russia.
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Firstly, this is due to the fact that the determination of the exact time when consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Crimea Government to transfer its authority in part or in full to Russia is highly complex from an evidentiary perspective. Secondly, all discriminatory actions against investors that are not committed by the agents of Russia under the personal model will not be attributable to Russia.
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The territorial model would apply through the exercise of governmental authority elements by the Russian Federation in Crimea and its control over the foreign investors (or investments). Importantly, in comparison to the investment treaty regime, the legal status of the Russian occupation is not determinative of the question of jurisdiction. 149 As emphasised in Al-Skeini, 'whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation to secure to that individual 146 Loizidou (n 130) para 56. 147 Cyprus (n 129) para 77. 148 Jaloud (n 130) para 119. 149 ibid para 142.
the rights and freedoms under … the Convention …'. 150 Hence, the Russian Federation may be found responsible for violations of the ECHR outside its sovereign territory in respect of the individual holder of the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention.
This important implication of the ECHR, which guarantees a wider scope of protection than the Russia-Ukraine BIT and multilateral instruments has a twilight zone for the Ukrainian Government. As the so called 'separatist' regime had been allegedly established in Crimea before the Russian military invasion, Ukraine may also be liable under the ECHR for its failure to ensure property rights of investors within its territory.
c) Nationality of individual applicants
A certain nationality is not a requirement for the protection of property under the ECHR. The protection may be granted on an extraterritorial level, 152 following the case law of the ECtHR, be it the Banković standard of espace juridique, 153 which would still be applicable in this instance, or a more advanced standard defined in inter alia Al-Skeini 154 and confirmed in Jaloud.
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Articles 1 and 34 of the ECHR and article 5 of Protocol I 156 provide that everyone's rights and freedoms within the Contracting Parties' jurisdiction shall be protected and any victim of a violation committed by the Contracting Parties may file an application. Therefore, the standards of protection apply in the same manner for nationals and non-nationals of the ECHR Contracting states, 157 both natural and legal persons. 158 While practice concerning individual applications filed by natural and legal persons is settled, shareholders' standing to do so is a subject of debate. This is due to the nature of shareholding as a protected right 159 and its relation to the particular company's business. 160 liquidation, it may well be qualified as possession, 162 but not under any other scenario. 163 Put differently, only shareholders' property rights and not their financial interests are protected under the ECHR, a position the ECtHR borrowed from the Barcelona Traction reasoning.
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Applying this general rule to the Crimea scenario, both majority and minority shareholders cannot claim the consequential loss in the value of the shares 165 resulting from mistreatment of the company, if the company can apply separately or through its liquidators.
However, if the said mistreatment directly affects the businesses of the shareholder linked to the mistreated company's business, in this case the shareholder may be regarded as a victim. 166 Unlike in the human rights context, in the investment protection system an indirect expropriation without actual transfer or direct loss is still regarded as property taking, 167 as it has an effect on the shareholders' possession. 168 This, of course, depends on the wording of the particular treaty in question.
To compare the two dispute resolution mechanisms, nationality and legal personality of the individual applicant do not play a decisive role in the activation of the protection under the ECHR. However, individual shareholders, especially minority shareholders and those whose possession is limited to monetary interest, 169 or those only affected indirectly 170 may lack separate standing from that of the company's before the ECtHR. Thus, Ukrainian investors may arguably have more chances to protect their rights under the framework of ECHR vis-re the shareholders. Given the illegality of Russiatheannexation conduct, the illegality of follow-up conduct attributable to that state would be consistent from a systemic perspective and the principle of effective protection of individuals under a state jurisdiction.
Thus, the human rights models of jurisdiction provide for a more adequate framework to ensure the protection of investors than the relatively unsettled investor-state models.
Admissibility under the ECHR: an analysis of the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement
Exhaustion of domestic remedies is generally required in a human rights regime but not in foreign investment frameworks. 171 Neither the Russia-Ukraine BIT 172 nor the ECT require an investor to make use of the domestic remedies before it can bring the dispute before an international tribunal.
The requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies applies to both inter-state and individual cases as a preliminary condition for the examination of the case on merits. 173 The exceptions to this rule include denial of access to remedies, prevention from their exhaustion, and lack of effectiveness or adequacy of available remedies. 174 The exceptions apply provided that substantial 175 evidence of these exceptions exists in relation to repetition, accumulation and official state tolerance of relevant human rights violations. 176 The first concern in this regard is the effectiveness and will of the Russian domestic judiciary to deal with issues related to the property claims of Ukrainian investors. The second concern is related to whether the ECtHR would be open to waive the requirement of domestic litigation in the annexing country in light of its decision in Demopoulos and others v Turkey.
The Court held that where there is no direct correlation of the official recognition or the purported assumption of sovereignty of the annexing state over the annexed territory and the application of article 35 of ECHR, the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement was not to be waived. 177 The third concern regards the independence of the Russian judiciary, which is obliged to refer to the Russian Constitutional Court under article 125(4) of the 184 'triple identity' concerns the same identity of parties, cause of action and object of the dispute.
Available remedies
Under the human rights regime, expropriation does not automatically lead to full compensation. In contrast, under the investment regime the duty to compensate is linked to expropriation and its lawfulness. In fact, 'prompt and effective' compensation is a constitutive element of the notion of lawful expropriation. Otherwise, the expropriation will be unlawful and a higher amount of compensation may be due. 185 Further, the threshold for a finding of expropriation in the human rights regime is higher than under the investment treaty framework and should amount to 'total deprivation'. This excludes proportional and nondiscriminatory deprivation 186 for public purposes. 187 Thus, if the interference accords with public interests or does not impose a burden on the victim, a property owner may receive fair market value compensation. 188 However, with protection of foreigners, the proportionality test threshold is raised under general principles of international law. 189 Full compensation linked to the value of property taken exists only with regards to deprivation of property, whereas control of the enjoyment of possession will consequently bring the claimant just satisfaction. given the factual circumstances serving as a vehicle for this analysis. 206 Diplomatic protection will be analysed in the context of its advantages and limitations including nationality of the injured alien, exhaustion of domestic remedies and reparations.
Advantages of diplomatic protection
First, the definition of diplomatic protection regards as objects of protection both individuals and property. This is an advantage if one considers that, as studied before, the human rights law framework requires a great deal of argumentative gymnastics if the purpose is to protect a certain type of property. 209 That has been precisely its overall narrative since the conflict arose. However, states exercising diplomatic protection in a way which legitimises Russia's sovereignty claims would be in breach of the obligation 'to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognising any such altered status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea'. 210 That, in turn, carries its own policy and international relations implications which would determine in the long term whether any diplomatic protection action is undertaken by third states whose nationals have been affected by Russian sponsored action in Crimea. of DADP suggests that due consideration be given to requests of diplomatic protection. 235 National case law supports this approach in common law jurisdictions. 236 
Limitations of diplomatic protection a) Exhaustion of domestic remedies
c) Reparations
Since the injury in the diplomatic protection context is suffered by the state of nationality, then there is no obligation to transfer reparations to individuals directly wronged. 237 However, article 19 of the DADP recommends that this be implemented as good practice. 238 If investment treaty claims are assessed purely on the basis of the harm caused to the economic interests of the investor, damages suffered by an injured alien are never identical in kind with the state's injury. 239 That reparations may be out of reach to the investor does not equate to there not being an incentive to pursue the diplomatic protection avenue. In some instances, cessation of the wrongful act 240 would satisfy the investor's expectations, in others cessation may equate restitution.
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In sum, injured aliens have a right to request their home state to exercise diplomatic protection on their behalf at any stage after the injury was suffered, or if the respondent state is not complying with an award or decision obtained in an investor-state arbitration proceeding or before a human rights court. Diplomatic protection may be considered as a safety net -an alternative venue for protection or an instance of last resort. In the absence of investment or human rights frameworks diplomatic protection may be the only available international remedy.
Diplomatic protection on behalf of shareholders can be exercised against the state whose actions caused an international wrong, including the state of incorporation. Therefore, the states of shareholders' nationality may consider exercising diplomatic protection against
Ukraine -the state of incorporation in the Crimea scenario. At the policy level, the state of shareholder's nationality may regard its diplomatic interest in strengthening ties with Russia as prevailing over its interest in the matter of its national. This may be a highly probable outcome because the position and interest of the state in a particular dispute is different from the investors' entrepreneurial focus and economic interests.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The annexation of Crimea illustrates a challenge to the international legal order in general and the regime of foreign investment protection in particular. Several investment claims brought under the framework of the Russia-Ukraine BIT by Ukrainian companies raised concerns about the prospects of investment treaty protection of Ukrainian and foreign nationals in the annexed territory of Crimea from the spectrum of available international venues for redress analysed in this article.
The objective difficulties which might impede the implementation of investment treaties in the circumstances of illegal use of force were solved in human rights case law and established in principles of extraterritorial protection. This article suggests that the human rights framework for the protection of individual and property rights extraterritorially and regardless of the injured alien's nationality make the ECtHR a more accessible venue for the protection of Ukrainian investors in Crimea than options available under investor-state arbitration. This, however, does not apply to shareholders. Their standing under the individual application process is limited to the protection of direct property rights. In this instance, the investor-state arbitration system offers a comprehensive case law on indirect investment protection under particular treaty instruments.
Furthermore, this article demonstrates that diplomatic protection provides an important opportunity, which may be the only one available in some instances, e.g. in cases of injured aliens whose home states do not have investment treaties with Russia in the Crimea scenario. However, diplomatic protection is discretional and limited by the political reluctance and pursuits of the state that may be different from the interests of the injured investor. Importantly, the Russian Federation is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council with veto-wielding power; therefore, some states of injured aliens' nationality will be more likely to exercise diplomatic protection against it than others, a decision that would hinge on 'realpolitik' concerns.
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In terms of practical considerations, both the human rights and diplomatic protection regimes provide for 'half a loaf' protection, which is in any event better than 'no bread'. In other words, just satisfaction or mere cessation of the wrongful act could provide sufficient (or at least acceptable) redress to investors who cannot gain access to remedies providing for standards akin to full reparation.
With respect to challenges, the annexation of Crimea will undoubtedly shape the potential treaty drafting practice that should appropriately answer the changing dynamics of international relations. Furthermore, since the territorial and the use of force questions in the Crimea scenario are unlikely to be fully resolved in the foreseeable future, 243 they still will be conditioned by the domino consequences of pending and upcoming separate investment and human rights claims. Since the prohibition to legitimise Russia's illegal annexation does not preclude courts and tribunals to make their findings, these sectoral disputes may cause the illegality of the annexing state's conduct to be highlighted and possibly built up from a 'one case at a time' judicial approach.
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Human rights consequences, extraterritorial conduct, and huge losses for investors seem to be more easily talked about and dealt with because they do not require the international community to take a definite stand in the bigger political debate that would entail huge economic and legal consequences. The conclusion that follows is that investment and human rights claims connected with the annexation of Crimea set up the stage for bigger questions to be addressed in the future. 
